Raymond Barrett

Sunday Business Post
by Raymond Barrett

US president Barack Obama welcomed his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai to Washington last week, as the two leaders sought to rebuild a relationship that had faltered amid allegations of corruption, electoral fraud and recurring civilian casualties.

During a joint address in the White House, Obama downplayed reports of a serious rift between their respective administrations.

‘‘With respect to perceived tensions between the US government and the Afghan government, let me begin by saying a lot of them were simply overstated,” he said.

Obama then outlined his goals in Afghanistan, the most immediate being an upcoming offensive against the Taliban in its traditional stronghold around the southern city of Kandahar.

The success of this operation is likely to affect another key policy objective – to begin withdrawing troops from the country by July 2011.

Despite the niceties, there is no denying that the ‘nation building’ project in Afghanistan is in serious difficulty.

While the country faces many challenges, corruption (allegations reach as high as Karzai’s own brother) is an oft-cited concern.

Vanda Falbab-Brown, a security specialist at the Brookings Institute and the author of Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, told The Sunday Business Post that the Afghan National Police regularly extorted money from the civilian population, forcing them to hand over bribes simply to use the roads.

Describing the practice as the ‘‘Achilles’ heel of the Afghan project’’, she added that ‘‘it feeds the Taliban and resentment against the government’’.

Yet there are even more disturbing accusations. Reports have surfaced that the US is indirectly funding the Taliban and other insurgents through its use of Afghan subcontractors, who provide logistical support to US troops.

In order to use certain roads, such as the one that runs from Kabul to Kandahar, these subcontractors pay suspected militants ‘‘protection money’’ so their truck convoys can reach their destinations safely. In such a scenario, the long term implications for Washington are sobering.

With such large profits available to local contractors, some of whom are related to senior government figures, why would such officials ever want the Americans to leave?

By focusing on issues such as good governance, the Obama administration has attempted to charter a somewhat different course from that of its predecessor.

Felbab-Brown criticised the previous policies employed by the US, whereby money was thrown at various regional leaders and warlords, and development aid was sometimes horse-traded with villagers for often dubious intelligence on the Taliban.

‘‘We have to get away from the idea of buying or renting the Afghans,” she said.

While the prognosis for the country is poor, there was one noticeable change in the diplomatic nomenclature that raised the possibility of convalescence.

Post September 11, Afghan insurgents have generally been defined in Washington as enemies to be unambiguously defeated. Yet the current US ambassador to Afghanistan spoke last week about ‘‘reconciliation’’ and the possible ‘‘reintegration’’ of the Taliban – a geopolitical sea change that may prove more effective (and less costly) for all concerned.